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NATURAL EASEMENTS.'
By HARRY A. BIGELOW-2
There is, in the law of real property, a certain group of rights
frequently referred to as natural rights, less frequently as natural
easements. Just how broad are these natural rights or easements
is a matter upon which the states vary in certain details. In all
states except those in which the appropriation theory of water rights
prevails, the right to the flow of a stream not unreasonably dimin-
ished or polluted is said to be a natural right: the right of support
for land in its natural condition by adjacent and subjacent land;
the right to have the air not unreasonably deteriorated by odors,
noises, etc., are almost universally recognized as natural rights.
The same view is taken in many states as to the right to discharge
surface water on adjacent land to which it would naturally drain.
No attempt is made to state the scope of these rights with exact-
ness but merely to indicate in a general way what they are. There
is another group of what may be called true easement rights. Such
are rights of way, rights of drainage, rights of support for build-
ings and many others. The question that I wish to consider is this:
just what difference, if any, is there fundamentally between these
two groups of rights, not merely as a matter of names, but as a
matter of analysis of the jural relations involved in the two con-
ceptions?
Perhaps the difference between the two groups of rights that
most readily suggests itself is that the natural right or natural
easement merely restricts the owner of the quasi-servient estate in
acts upon his own land, while the true easement gives to the owner
of the dominant estate a privilege of action upon the servient estate.
But this latter proposition is not true of the negative easements of
lights and adjacent support, and, on the other hand, the natural
easement of drainage of surface water, if it does not give a privilege
to act upon the land of another at least gives a privilege to produce
consequences upon that land. Furthermore, such a criterion would
have to ignore the easement of fencing and of payment of money3
and the cognate rights that are the subject matter of covenants run-
ning with the land.
1. A paper read before the Legal Club of Chicago.
2. Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
3. JVhittenton Manufacturing Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N. E.
441 (1895). Compare Packenham's Case, Y. B. 42 Ed. III, 3, pl. 14 (1368).
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Far more important is the distinction that is made by Professor
Terry in his learned and valuable treatise on the Principles of
Anglo-American Law. Speaking of the natural easement with
respect to stream water he says :4
"The right to have water flow to land in a natural watercourse is said
not to be an easement, but a 'natural right, a mere portion of the ordinary
right of property.' ut this refers to the manner in which the right is
acquired, not to its nature. It means simply that the proprietor of land to
which a stream flows is not obliged to resort to any prescription, grant or
other special title separate from his title to his land to support his right to
the flow of water, nor is he compelled to show that he has ever appropriated
the water by making any use of it."
Again, speaking of the natural rights of lateral support for
land, he says :5
"The right of support for land in its natural condition is a 'natural right'
forming a part of the ordinary right of property, and not an easement to be
specially acquired, in which it resembles the last described right. The con-
trary is true of the right of support for land artificially burdened. But these
are only differences in the dispositive facts. The nature of the two rights
when once acquired is the same. * * * This being so, the question arises:
Which land is the subject of the right? Is it to be regarded as a right in the
servient tenement or as merely an element of or addition to the right in the
dominant tenement? The question is not one of much, if any, practical im-
portance, but would need to be decided in order to fix the position of this
right in a systematically arranged corpus juris and to determine the form in
which the corresponding duties should be stated. * * * The owner of a
servient tenement can grant such a right of support and the grant will be
good against his successors in title and also, I suppose, will convey a right
on which an action can be maintained against a stranger who violates it.
Now, as such owner by mere covenant could not bind strangers, however it
might be as to his successors in title, it seems that his grant must be effective
to convey a right in rent, which of course would be a right in the servient
tenement, that being the only thing in which he could convey such a right."
The same idea seems to underlie the language of the court in
J'fanneville Co. v. Worcester.6 The defendant in Massachusetts
diverted the waters of a stream that furnished power to the plaintiff's
mill in Rhode Island so that the plaintiff could not continue to
operate the mill. He brought action for this diversion. Holmes, J.,
in speaking of the nature of the rights involved used this language:
"The defendant's counsel contended, in the first place, that such rights
as the plaintiff claims cannot extend beyond the Rhode Island line, and went
the length of maintaining that a servitude cannot be created in one state in
favor of lands in another. We are unable to agree to this proposition upon
either principle or authority. * * *
"We think that the cases which recognize civil * * * liability for
flowing land in one state by means of a dam in another, are hardly less perti-
nent. * * * The defendant admits these cases to be law and tries to dis-
tinguish them. But we cannot assent to the distinction between discharging
and withdrawing water. The consequence in one case is positive, in the other
negative; but in each it is the consequence of an act done outside the juris-
diction where the harm occurs, and the consequence is as direct in the latter
case as in the former. The right infringed in the former case is called abso-
lute ownership; in the latter easement. * * *
4. P. 382.
5. Ibid.
6. 138 Mass. 89 (1884).
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"Of course the laws of Rhode Island cannot subject -Massachusetts land
to a servitude, and * * * Massachusetts might prohiboit the creation of
such servitudes. So it might authorize any acts to be done within its limits.
however injurious to land or persons outside them. But it does not do either.
It has no more objection to a citizen of Rhode Island owning an easement,
as incident to his ownersip of land in that state, than it has to his owning it
in gross, or to his purchasing lands here in fee. * * * So far as their
creation is concerned, the law of Massachusetts governs, whether the mode of
creation be by deed or prescription, or whether the right be one which is
regarded as naturally arising out of the relation between tile two estates."
It is submitted, with all deference, that while the difference in
the origin of true easements and natural easements, as stated in
these two extracts, is fundamental, the implications from that
difference in origin do not seem to be completely developed. In
order to consider to the full the effect upon the nature of these two
groups of rights that is traceable to their different origin it will be
advisable to make an examination of some of the elements com-
prised in the aggregate of rights that an owner of land has with
respect thereto. 7 First lie has what are ordinarily called privileges
or permissive rights with respect to the land, i. e., lie may use it as
lie sees fit; lie may dig in it; erect buildings on it, cultivate it, or he
may let it lie idle and do nothing with it: in fact the privileges of
user of an owner of lahd are so varied that it is useless to attempt to
enumerate them. It will be noticed that there are no duties on the
part of other members of society correlative to these privilges, the
relation of any such other member is purely negative. All that can
be said is that no right of his is violated by the landowner's exer-
cising any of these privileges.
In addition to these privileges of user any given landowner has
certain rights in the narrow sense, i. e., legal relations that imply
correlative duties on the part of other members of society. Thus
a landowner has the right against every other such member that the
latter shall not walk on the land. or erect structures on it or other-
wise occupy or use it. 'More than this, each landowner has the right
against the other members of society that they shall not interfere
with him in the exercise of any of the privileges above referred to.
This same relation, instead of being expressed in terms of the privi-
leges and rights of the owner of the land, may be expressed from
the point of view of the other members of society by saying that
they have no right that the owner of the land shall not engage in
the various courses of action that lie is privileged to engage in, and
further that they are under a duty not to go on his land or to inter-
fere with him in the exercise thereon of his privileges. This repre-
7. See Terry, Principles of Anglo-American Law, pp. 84-101, ch. 12;
Salmond, Jurisprudence 2 ed., chs. 10, 11, 12.
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sents the norm of rights so far as they need be considered here,
which every owner of real property has.
Now suppose that A, as the owner of land, grants B a right
of way across it. How does this affect the legal relation of the
parties? A's legal position has been changed in these regards.
First, he has given up certain rights against B. Whereas formerly
he had the right against B that the latter should not come on his
land, there are now circumstances under which he does not have
the right to have B not come on his land. Second, he has lost
certain privileges, that he formerly had. He may not build on his
land or dig in it or otherwise use it in such a manner as to inter-
fere with B's uses as defined by the instrument creating the ease-
ment. The change in legal relations from B's point of view may be
stated thus: first, he has acquired against A the right that A shall
not exercise his normal privileges so far as they produce the results
last above mentioned; second, he has acquired those privileges of
action on A's land that are ordinarily defined in the instrument
creating the easement. The analysis thus outlined is applicable to
the greater part of the easements that are recognized by the common
law. At the same time as has been already pointed out8 the existance
of the easements of light and lateral support show that it is not
always true that B as dominant gets a privilege of action upon the
servient estate. Again the easement of fencing and those covenants
that run with the land vary from both the two preceding groups
in that they impose affirmative duties upon A. The common and
fundamental characteristic of all these relations, however, is the
fact that they all represent a departure from the norm of property
rights; an acquisition of property rights by B in the servient piece
either in an actual increase of privileges with respect thereto or in
the giving up of privileges with respect thereto by A.9 That this
latter jural relation should properly be classified as a property right
by B in A's piece is clear from the latter part of the extract from
Professor Terry quoted earlier in this discussion.1 0
8. Alte.
9. It would seem that further than this there is no characteristic common
to all easements: the difference between the affirmative easements such as
way and the negative easements such as light have already been pointed out.
But the characteristics common to them, viz., loss of privilege by the servient
tenement, is not true of an easement to commit a nuisance such as sending
odors over the servient land; there is in this case the loss of right by the
servient and increase of privilege by the dominant true of the easement of
way, but there is no loss of privilege on the part of the servient although the
enjoyment of some privileges may be made practically impossible by the exer-
cise of the easement.
10. Ante, p. 3.
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Let us now turn from the true easement to the so-called natural
easements. Mention has already been made of some of the various
rights in a general sense, that normally the owner of land has as
such. What this norm of rights or duties is may vary under dif-
ferent systems of law or under the same system at different times.
But the norm is capable of approximately exact determination at
any given time. Thus in our law as it is now constituted B has a
right against A that the latter shall not dump his rubbish on B's
land, and that he shall not break B's windows by throwing stones
through them. These are both courses of action that must originate
near or on B's land. Suppose that A stands on his own adjacent
land when he dumps the rubbish on B's land or breaks his windows.
Does the fact that this constftutes a violation of B's rights against
A justify us in saying that B has certain rights in A's land or in
A's rubbish or in the stone which A throws? Clearly not. What
we are dealing with is not B's rights irl A's property but his rights
in his own property. The fact that the course of action that caused
these violations originated on A's land is immaterial. The violation
of B's right would be just the same if the act had been done by a
trespasser on A's land. Nor would B's right be any different if A
owned all the land adjacent to B's so that in order to commit this
tort the course of action must have originated on A's land. The
conception is not that A has lost certain interests in his own land
that he at one time possessed and that B has acquired them. A has
all the rights of ownership in his land or his rubbish or his stone
that any one can have. All that has been done is to state with a
certain exactitude just what is the norm of B's rights in particular
regards with respect to his property and the norm of A's duties
with respect to his. It would seem that on principle this is all
that the so-called natural easements amount to. Just as A is under
a duty not to break B's windows, so he is under a duty not to make
B's land subside; just as he is under a duty not to dump rubbish on
B's land, so he is under a duty not to pollute the air over B's land
or the stream that flows by B's land; and the same thing is true of
his duty not to diminish the stream unreasonably. But just as with
the torts previously referred to, so the statement of the violation of
these natural rights does not carry the implication that B has certain
property rights in A's land that limit what would otherwise be A's
normal freedom of action with respect thereto. It is merely a
statement of what the normal duties of landowners (among other
persons) are. to other landowners. It is perfectly conceivable that
the norn of property rights in our law might have developed other-
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wise. A system of law might take the shape of allowing persons to
go over the land of another as they saw fit. Or the law might have
taken the shape of refusing to give damages when one land owner
by excavating caused the land of another to subside. If the law
had so developed in these regards, the norm of rights then would
have been somewhat different from what it in reality is. The
important fact is that these so-called natural easements seem to be
nothing but an emphasizing in a somewhat misleading way of certain
aspects of the norm of property rights in our law as it has actually
developed. Indeed it is possible to pick out other aspects of our
law of property as it stands that might just as properly be placed
in the category of natural easements: the rights in California and
some other states to underground waters :11 and the doctrine em-
bodied in Rylands v. Fletcher12 are indistinguishable in principle
from the rights usually classed as natural easements, and the latter
right is appropriately classified by Mr. Tiffany in his work on Real
property1 with the other natural rights.
There are, of course, certain differences between the torts first
mentioned and those mentioned as being breaches of natural rights.
The first are violations of the possession of the plaintiff and are
usually the subject of an action of trespass; the second are violations
of rights that the plaintiff has by virtue of his possession but they
would not perhaps be classified as violations of his possession within
what seems to be the ordinary meaning of that term; they would
normally be redressed at common law by an action on the case.
While these differences must be admitted, it is submitted that they
do not affect the ultimate difference between natural easements and
true easements. These differences may, by way of recapitulation be
stated thus: the so-called natural easements give one landowner
neither rights nor privileges in the land of another; they are merely a
statement of rights against the world at large that every landowner
has as such not to have certain consequences produced upon or with
respect to his land: the fundamental characteristics of a true ease-
ment is that it is a lessening of the normal rights of the owner in a
given piece of land and a transferring of those rights to some third
person, ordinarily the owner of another piece of land.
There are several situations in which the theoretical difference
as thus worked out between natural and true easements would
seem to be of practical importance.
11. Katz v. [Valkhishaw. 141 Cal. 116, 64 L. R. A. 236 (1903).
12. L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
13. Vol. 1, ch. 11.
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The first situation is this. Where a license is given by A to B
for the latter to do an act of such a character that if the license
were held irrevocable after being acted upon the result would be
to create an easement other than by an instrument under seal, the
courts have almost uniformly held that such license is revocable
even though acted upon. Thus a license to build an aqueduct, or
to lay pipes or to build a way over the licensor's land may be
revoked by the licensor even after it has been acted upon by the
licensee. Courts of equity have in several states sometimes held
the license to be irrevocable if acted on; their decision being rested
upon the grounds of an implied contract to give an easement, or of
fraud or estoppel. Where, on the other hand, the license is to do an
act in derogation of an easement right of the licensor and the
license is acted upon, it is held to be irrevocable and a subsequent
attempt by the licensor to recall the license and re-assert his ease-
ment is ineffective. 14
Taking the distinction above outlined, suppose that B, a lower
riparian proprietor, authorizes A, an upper riparian, to erect a dam
and divert an unreasonably large amount of water from the stream,
and A does so. May B subsequently revoke his license and there-
after sue A for violation of his right to have the water come down
not unreasonably diminished. Since B's right is not an easement
that restricts A in the use of his own land but one of the incidents
of B's ownership of his own piece it would seem, on the principles
above stated, that the license should be held revocable. In the lead-
ing case in the subject, Liggins v. Inge," the license was held revo-
cable. The case went upon the appropriation theory of water rights,
not upon the present common law rule, and this of course seriously
affects the value of the case as a precedent. In Addison v. Hack",
it was held on the same facts that the license could not be revoked
without offering to put the license in statu quo. On the other hand
a license to pollute a stream has been held revocable by the licensee, 7
and a license to violate the natural right to quiet has been held
revocable by a successor of the original licensor.' In both these
latter cases the license had to a degree been acted upon by the
14. Collections of cases upon these points will be found in the L. R. A.
notes to Pifer v. Brown. 43 W. Va. 412, 49 L. R. A. 497 (1897), and Yeagcr
v. Tuning, 79 Oh. St. 121. 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 700 (1908).
15. 7 Bing. 682 (1831).
16. 2 Gill ("!d.) 221 (1844). Compare Jensen v. Hunter (Cal.) 41 Pac.
14 (1895).
17. Dwight s,. Hayes, 150 Ill. 273, 37 N. E. 218 (1894).
18. Panama Realty Co. v. City of New York, 158 N. Y. App. Div. 726,
143 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1913).
HeinOnline  -- 9 Ill. L. R.  547 1914-1915
548 ILLINOIS LA V REVIEW
licensee, in both the decisions were rested upon the ground that to
hold the license irrevocable would be in substance to create an ease-
ment in a method unknown to the common law; in other words, that
the licensing of an act in derogation of a "natural easement" is not
in truth the relinquishment but the creation of an easement.
A more important question is as to jurisdiction in eminent
domain. Suppose B has a farm in Illinois, immediately adjoining a
farm of A's in Wisconsin, the state line being the dividing line
between the farms. Now suppose first that B has a right of way
over the Wisconsin farm. May Wisconsin condemn that right of
way? Clearly so. Since it has control over the land it has com-
plete jurisdiction over all rights and privileges that centre in that
land, that go to make its complete title. Normally they would all
be in A; in this case part of them are in B but however divided the
ownership of the privileges and rights in that land they are Wis-
consin rights, and within its control. Suppose that there is also
a brook that flows from the Wisconsin farm to the Illinois farm;
and suppose that Wisconsin acquires by condemnation the complete
title to the Wisconsin land; may it thereafter dam the brook so as to
prevent any of the water reaching B, or to take another case, may
it so excavate in its own side of the line as to cause B's land to sub-
side? Or, again, may it erect a garbage plant on the land and
send the odors over B's land? If the conception of the natural
rights involved in these questions is that they are limiting interests
in the Wisconsin land they are just as much under the control of
Wisconsin as the right of way; if they are merely a statement of
the right of B to be free from certain damages to his land, just
as he has the right to be free from damages to his person, Wisconsin
would have no such right.
So far as the decisions go, the most common case is where the
act in the first state produces an actual trespass in the second state,
as where a lower riparian state condemns land for a dam which
backs up into the upper state. That the condemnation proceedings
in the lower state cannot prejudice the rights of the upper owners
seems well settled.19 The case of Missouri v. Illinois
20 was an action
for the pollution of the Mississippi river by the discharge from the
Chicago drainage canal. The court held that in fact no actionable
pollution by Illinois was shown. It seems clear, however, that had
19. U. S. v. Aine.s, 1 Woodbury & Minot, 76 (1845); Rutz v. St. Louis,
7 Fed. 438 (1881); Holyoke Power Co. v. Cona. River Co., 52 Conn. 570(1884).
20. 200 U. S. 496 (1906).
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such pollution been shown no attempt at condemnation by Illinois
would have been a defense. The cases of retention of water present
a similar problem. The question is suggested by the case of Kansas
v. Colorado.-'2 This was an action brought by the state of Kansas
against Colorado, an action for diverting the waters of the Arkansas
river to the prejudice of the plaintiff state. As in the preceding
case, the Supreme Court found that no unreasonable uses of the
stream had been shown to exist. At the same time the court clearly
recognized the principle that it was not in the power of Colorado by
any kind of proceeding to cut out the rights of Kansas with respect
to the river. The same conclusion was reached in an article on
The Power of a State to divert an Interstate River in the Harvard
Law Review.22
So far as any attempt by condemnation to deprive immediately
adjoining land in another state of its right to pure air on its right
to lateral support, an examination has revealed no cases; the impossi-
bility of so doing, however, would seem to be as clear on principle
as in the cases already mentioned.
A recent case in the supreme court of the United States makes
in another field an application of the distinction under discussion.
In the case of Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co.-3 the facts were as
follows :-The plaintiffs were citizens of New York, the defendant
a New Jersey corporation. The plaintiffs owned extensive tracts
of timber land in Georgia; the defendant had a smelter in Tennessee,
the fumes and gases from which killed the timber on the plaintiff's
land, damaging it to the extent of over $50,000. The eighth section
of the act of 1875, determining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts
of the United States provides: "That when in any suit commenced
21. 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
22. 8 Harv. Law Rev. 138. It will be noticed that the foregoing discus-
sion has been based upon this predicate, viz., that by the common law of both
states involved there is a right of the kind under discussion, as not to have a
stream unreasonably polluted or diminished, not to have land caused to sub-
side, to be free from objectionable odors, and the like; that such being the
common law rights an attempt is then made by one state to condemn one of
these confessedly existing rights and the question has been whether it was in
the power of the state so to (do. If by the law of the state where the course
of action was set in motion that produced the damage in the second such
setting in motion or such production of damage (if the latter had also taken
place in the same state) would not be a violation of any right, while by the
law of the second state it would be a violation of a right, a question would
be presented quite apart from that now under discussion and which, not in
the field of easement, natural or otherwise, may be illustrated by this case:
If by the law of state X it is not a tort to dump rubbish on the land of a
third person, and by the law of state Y it is, and A standing in state X dumps
rubbish on the land of B in state Y, is that a tort?
23. 218 U. S. 357 (1910).
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in any circuit court of the United States, to enforce any legal or
equitable lien or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or
cloud upon the title to real or personal property within the district
where such suit is brought, one or more of the defendants shall not
be an inhabitant of, or found within such district" the court may
order service by publication, after which "it shall be lawful for the
court to entertain jurisdiction" but any adjudication shall affect
only property, the subject of the suit, and, under the jurisdiction
of the court within the district. Action was brought in the United
States circuit court for the district wherein the smelters were sit-
uated. The plaintiff's complaint- alleged, that because of the facts
stated above they were possessed of a "right and claim in, to and
against the said lands of the defendants in the nature of an ease-
ment 24 thereupon that the same shall not be used in a manner to
injure or destroy the said lands and forests" of the plaintiffs, and
asked for damages and-an injunction. The court below dismissed
the bill for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal the Supreme Court, in
passing on the question raised by the plaintiffs' theory of jurisdic-
tion said:
"In no just sense can their cause of action be said to constitute 'a claim
to' real property in the district. They cannot be regarded as having a 'claim
to' the leased land or premises on which the alleged nuisance is maintained.
It may be that what the defendant is charged with doing creates a nuisance.
It may also be that the defendant company wrongfully uses and has used its
property in Tennessee in such a way as to seriously injure the property of
the plaintiffs * * * and that the plaintiffs are legally entitled by some
mode of proceeding in some court to have the alleged nuisance abated and
their property in Georgia protected in the manner asked by them. * * * It
would be a most violent construction of the eighth section of the act of 1875
to hold that the right to have abated the nuisance in question arising from
the use in Tennessee of defendants' property, because of the injurious effects
upon plaintiffs' real property in Georgia, creates, in the meaning of the
statute, a 'claim to' real property within the district where the suit is brought."
It is submitted that the decision, though couched in terms of
statutory construction, is fundamentally a clear and accurate appli-
cation of the distinction attempted to be set forth in this discussion.
24. My italics.
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